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AbstrACt
Objective To quantify changes in tobacco tax rates and 
cigarette affordability after countries ratified the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) using 
with the WHO MPOWER standards.
Methods We used logistic regression to assess the 
association of FCTC ratification with adoption of at least 
50% and 75% (high) of retail price tobacco tax rates for 
the most sold brands in countries, accounting for years 
since ratification and other covariates. We also compared 
cigarette affordability in 2014 with 1999.
results By 2014, 44% of high-income countries had 
taxes above 75% of retail value compared with 18% 
in 1998/1999. In 15 years, 69 countries increased the 
tobacco tax rate, 33 decreased it and one had the same 
tax rate. FCTC ratification was not associated with 
implementing high tobacco taxes. More fragile countries 
in terms of security, political, economic and social 
development were less likely to have at least 50% and 
75% tobacco tax rates in 2014 compared with 1999. 
The higher the cigarette prices in 1999 the less likely the 
countries were to have at least 75% tobacco tax rates in 
2014. However, cigarettes were less affordable in 2014 
than in 1999 in countries that had ratified FCTC earlier.
Conclusions Despite widespread FCTC ratification, 
implementing higher tobacco taxes remains incomplete. 
Guidelines for FCTC Article 6 implementation should assign 
definite targets for tobacco taxes and for implementation 
of a tax escalator that gradually increases taxes to 
match rising income levels. Fragile countries are less 
likely to have high tobacco taxes and less affordable 
cigarettes. The tobacco control community should intensify 
efforts to help fragile countries improve performance 
in FCTC implementation both through strengthening 
their administrative and technical capacity and through 
supporting basic functions of government.
IntrOduCtIOn 
Raising tobacco taxes is an effective strategy 
to reduce tobacco use.1–3 On average a 10% 
price increase will reduce tobacco use by 4% 
in high-income countries and by 5% among 
low-income and middle-income countries.4 
Article 6 of the WHO Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control5 (FCTC) commits parties 
to implement 'tax policies and, where appro-
priate, price policies, on tobacco products 
so as to contribute to the health objectives 
aimed at reducing tobacco consumption'.5 
Article 6 implementation guidelines6 recom-
mend tax policies which take into account 
tobacco products’ price elasticity (the rate 
by which tobacco consumption decreases as 
result of price increases) and income elas-
ticity (the sensitivity of tobacco consumption 
to income changes) to make tobacco prod-
ucts less affordable over time, but does not 
set specific targets for taxes or prices.
Tobacco industry tactics to block tax 
increases have a major influence on tax rates, 
and industry responses to tax increases have a 
major effect on cigarette prices. Tobacco taxes 
are politically difficult to raise because tobacco 
companies fight tax increases2 by commis-
sioning research claiming economic benefits 
of tobacco, creating alliances,7 including with 
progressive organisations,8 lobbying minis-
tries of finance with poor knowledge of public 
health and FCTC requirements,9 and arguing 
tax increases drive illicit trade2 and hurt 
disadvantaged groups.8 10 11 They also learnt 
how to cope with tax increases and sometimes 
actually benefit from them by overshifting 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► We assessed changes in tobacco taxes and prices 
over 15 years in 103 countries.
 ► We used WHO’s own standards for effective tax 
rates.
 ► The willingness and ability of states to implement 
effective tobacco taxes was measured through state 
fragility index.
 ► The limitation of the study is that we could not anal-
yse how the tobacco companies respond to the tax 
increase.
 ► The baseline data came from two different data 
sources.
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taxes on premium brands to increase profits while down-
shifting taxes on ultra-low-price brands to cushion the 
effects of tax increases on total consumption.12–15 Even a 
series of substantial tax increases, such as in Australia,16 
may not increase the tax rate if the industry keeps over-
shifting tax increases to prices. In this sense, tax rates can 
be a relatively poor indicator of cigarette prices.
WHO established the MPOWER measures in 2008 to 
scale up key FCTC demand reduction measures including 
tobacco taxes. MPOWER emphasises that 'increasing the 
price of tobacco through higher taxes is the single most 
effective way to encourage tobacco users to quit and 
prevent children from starting to smoke'.2 A key finding 
of the 2015 MPOWER report was that taxes were the least 
implemented MPOWER measure with only 10% of the 
world’s population (living in 33 countries) covered by 
taxes of at least 75% of retail price.2 This paper assesses 
the association of FCTC ratification with implementing 
tobacco taxes by analysing changes in tax rate using the 
MPOWER standard and cigarette affordability. In addi-
tion, we assess the role of state capacity and previous tax 
and price levels17 18 on taxes in 2014.
MethOds
data
Data on the tobacco tax rate, including specific excise, 
ad valorem excise, import duties, value-added tax (VAT) 
and other taxes were obtained from the WHO Report 
on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 2015 public dataset 
for 2014.19 This dataset includes information collected 
by WHO in-country experts as of 31 December 2014 on 
the prices of the most-sold brand of cigarettes (both in 
local currency and in US$) and cigarette taxes. Informa-
tion on the taxation of cigarettes (and when possible, 
most commonly used tobacco products) was collected 
from ministries of finance. (Because WHO did not report 
tax data for Syria in 2014, we used the data from 2012 
for 2014.) In countries where different taxes applied to 
cigarettes based on length, quantity produced or type 
(eg, filter vs non-filter), the rate that applied to the most 
popular brand was used to calculate the tax rate.
We obtained baseline pre-FCTC taxes using the 1999 
World Bank (WB) survey of 64 countries that reported the 
share of cigarette taxes (including VAT) as a percentage 
of the retail price of a pack of cigarettes20 supplemented 
by the tobacco industry’s International Tobacco Docu-
mentation Centre’s21 1998 International Fiscal Guide to 
Tobacco that mapped international taxation, price and 
tariff policies.22
Tobacco tax rate is the portion of the price represented 
by all taxes, including VAT for the most-sold brand of ciga-
rettes, is our outcome variable. We studied two outcome 
variables derived from MPOWER standards in the WHO 
Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 2015: Raising Taxes 
on Tobacco: (1) taxes that totalled at least 75% of retail 
price, the highest MPOWER standard,2 and (2) taxes that 
totalled at least 50% of retail price, the second highest 
standard.2 FCTC Article 6 does not set targets on tobacco 
prices. The expectation in FCTC and MPOWER is that if 
the manufacturers increase wholesale prices so that the 
overall tax rate drops below 75% or 50%, the government 
would increase taxes so that the tax share would go above 
75% or 50%.
To analyse the income level of the countries we used 
WB 2016 gross national income (GNI) categories23: 
low-income countries were defined as those with a GNI 
per capita of $1045 or less in 2014; middle-income econ-
omies, $1046–$12 735; high income, $12 736 or more. 
Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income econo-
mies were separated at a GNI per capita of $4125. Since 
our sample included only eight low-income countries, 
after cross tabulation analysis, we combined low-in-
come and lower-middle-income categories in the regres-
sion analysis. We used information on cigarette prices 
expressed in nominal US$ in 1998/1999.
We analysed the association of FCTC with affordability 
of cigarettes by using the fraction of per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) that would be needed to buy 
100 packs of the most sold cigarette brand. This method 
is a more comprehensive and representative measure 
of income across countries in different income levels 
than, for example, surveys of wages.24 We used price data 
described above and WB data for GDP per capita for 1999 
and 2014.23 In addition, we used the growth of GDP per 
capita from 1999 to 201423 ((2014 GDP–1999 GDP)/1999 
GDP, GDP expressed in 2014 US$) as an independent 
variable on the assumption that cigarettes would be more 
affordable in 2014 among those countries where the rise 
in income level was the fastest. We assume that changes in 
GDP over the 16-year period reflect changes in disposable 
income.
Other variables
To study the willingness and ability of states to imple-
ment public policies, we used Marshall and Cole’s25 State 
Fragility Index. This index scores all countries with popu-
lation above 500 000 in four performance dimensions: 
security, political, economic and social. Previous literature 
has shown that state fragility matters for implementing 
effective cigarette health warnings.17 18 The index gives 
higher scores for more fragile countries (Sudan scored 
23 while the 15 most stable countries scored 0) but does 
not place countries into different categories. We averaged 
scores for 2007, 2010 and in 2013 to test whether more 
fragile countries were less likely to have high tobacco 
taxes in 2014. By more fragile countries, we refer to those 
countries which score higher on Marshall and Cole’s 
State Fragility Index.
We studied the role of previous tax and price levels on 
tax rate in 2014 with two variables, tobacco tax rates in 
1998/1999 and price of most sold cigarette packs in US$ 
in 1998/1999. We tested whether countries with higher 
cigarette taxes and higher price cigarettes in 1998/1999 
were more likely to have high tax rates in 2014.
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statistical analysis
Logistic regression was used in separate analyses with 75% 
and 50% tax rates in 2014 as the outcome variable. We 
studied the effect of FCTC by calculating the number of 
years since FCTC ratification as of 2014. We set years since 
ratification to 0 for countries that ratified the FCTC in 
2014 (El Salvador, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe), had signed 
but not ratified the FCTC as of the end of 2014 (Argen-
tina, Cuba, Haiti, Morocco, Mozambique, Switzerland 
and the USA), or had not signed or become parties to the 
FCTC by January 2016 (Andorra, Dominican Republic, 
Eritrea, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Monaco, 
Somalia). Countries that already had a tax rate of 50% 
(final sample used n=44) or 75% (n=88) in 1998/1999 
were excluded from the analysis.
Our analysis has 80% statistical power (with α=0.05) to 
detect an OR by a factor of 1.25 (or 0.80) associated with 
FCTC ratification.
We also used logistic regression to analyse the effect of 
the FCTC on cigarette affordability by assigning a value of 
1 for those countries where cigarettes were less affordable 
in 2014 than in 1999 and 0 where cigarettes were more 
affordable. We tested interaction between state capacity 
and FCTC ratification to see if more fragile countries 
were slower in ratifying FCTC. We also ran a sensitivity 
analysis to test if cigarettes are less affordable in countries 
with extensive tobacco control measures.
We used R functions glm and minEffect.VSMc.logistic 
from powerMediation for the analysis.
Patient and public involvement
Patients or public were not involved in the study.
results
Tobacco tax rates have not uniformly increased from 
1998/1999 to 2014 as shown in figure 1 where the coun-
tries are ranked by their tax rate in 1998/1999. The 
average tax rate increased from 53% of the price of the 
most sold cigarette brands in 1998/1999% to 58% in 2014. 
In those 15 years, 69 countries increased the tobacco tax 
rate, 33 decreased it (30 FCTC ratifying countries) and 1 
country (Austria) had the same tax rate.
In 1998/1999 only eight (18%) of high-income, two 
(8%; Brazil and Costa Rica) upper-middle-income, one 
lower-middle-income country (4%, Sri Lanka) and none 
of the low-income countries had a tax above 75% of the 
retail price (table 1). By 2014, 44% of high-income coun-
tries had taxes above 75% of retail value. The progress 
was slow among higher-income and lower-middle-income 
countries with just one additional country complying in 
each income category and no low-income country.
In 1998/1999, 37 (82%) of high-income countries had 
taxes that comprised above 50% of retail price, while only 
Figure 1 Tobacco tax rates in 1998/1999 and 2014 as per cent of retail price. FCTC, Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. 
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11 (46%) of higher-middle-income countries, 9 (35%) of 
lower-middle-income countries and 2 (23%) low-income 
country had that tax rate. By 2014, 39 (87%) of high-in-
come countries had taxes above 50% of retail price, as did 
16 (67%) of upper-middle -income countries, 13 (50%) 
of lower-middle-income countries and 1 (13%) low-in-
come country (Zimbabwe).
Forty-five countries changed WB status during the 
observation period. The following countries changed 
from low-income countries to lower-middle-income 
countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Honduras, India, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan and Vietnam. The 
following countries changed from lower-middle income 
countries to upper-middle income countries: Algeria, 
Belarus, Belize, Bulgaria, Columbia, Costa Rica, Domin-
ican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kazakh-
stan, Macedonia, Namibia, Panama, Romania, Russia, 
Suriname and Thailand. The following countries 
changed from upper-middle-income countries to high 
income countries: Barbados, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Republic of Korea, 
Slovakia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. Latvia 
and Lithuania changed from lower-income countries to 
high-income countries. No country changed to a lower 
income group.
The logistic regression showed that time since FCTC 
ratification was not associated with implementing high 
tobacco taxes (table 2). More fragile countries were less 
likely to have 75% and 50% tobacco tax rates in 2014. 
Countries with higher cigarette prices in 1998/1999 
were more likely to have 75% tax rates in 2014. Coun-
tries with higher tax rates in 1998/1999 were more likely 
than countries with lower tax rates in 1998/1999 to have 
75% tobacco tax rates in 2014. To test overall effects, we 
calculated a linear regression model for all countries in 
our sample with tax rates in 2014 as the dependent vari-
able and FCTC ratification, tax rate in 1999, price in 1999 
and state capacity as independent variables (R2=0.48). 
FCTC ratification and price were not statistically signifi-
cant (p>0.7 and p>0.3, respectively). The coefficients for 
tax rate in 1999 were 0.40 (p<0.001) and for state capacity 
−1.58 (p<0.001). The variance inflation factors in the first 
model ranged from 1.08 to 1.68 and in the second model 
from 1.04 to 1.12, well below the threshold for multicol-
linearity concern.
Table 1 Countries with 75% and 50% tobacco tax rates in 1998/1999 and 2014 by income group
Tobacco tax >75% (high) Tobacco tax >50%
Yes No
Fraction of 




  1998/1999 8 37 18 37 8 82
  2014 20 25 44 39 7 87
Upper-middle-income
  1998/1999 2 22 8 11 13 46
  2014 3 21 13 16 8 67
Lower-middle-income
  1998/1999 1 25 4 9 17 35
  2014 1 25 4 13 13 50
Low-income
  1998/1999 0 8 0 2 6 23
  2014 0 8 0 1 7 13
Table 2 Odds of passing high standard tobacco taxes by 2014 (among non-compliant countries in 1998/1999)
Variable
Tobacco tax ≥75% of retail price (high) Tobacco tax ≥50% of retail price
OR (95% Cl) OR (95% Cl)
Years since FCTC ratification 1.04 (0.81 to 1.43) 0.94 (0.76 to 1.15)
Tax rate in 1998/1999 1.07* (1.00 to 1.14) 1.01 (0.94 to 1.08)
Price in 1998/1999 0.31* (0.10 to 0.73) 0.78 (0.22 to 2.78)
State capacity 0.67† (0.49 to 0.83) 0.86* (0.74 to 0.99)
Number of countries (observations) 88 62
*P≤0.05, †P≤0.01.
FCTC, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
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As a sensitivity analysis, we also ran ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with actual tax rate in 2014 as 
the dependent variable for the whole sample. We used 
the same independent variables as in logit analysis. Tax 
rate in 1999 was positively associated with tax rate in 2014 
(coefficient 0.41, p=0.0003) and lack of state capacity 
was negatively associated with tax in 2014 (coeff. −1.52, 
p=0.00001). The results were essentially the same as the 
logistic regression analysis.
There were large differences in affordability of ciga-
rettes across countries in both 1999 and 2014 (figure 2). 
At the lower end of the range, in 2014 less than 1% of per 
capita GDP was required to buy 100 packs of the most sold 
cigarette brands in Luxembourg, while at the upper end 
in Tanzania the corresponding figure was 24.6% (28.9% 
in 1999). Cigarettes became less affordable between 1999 
and 2014 in 51 countries and more affordable in 40 coun-
tries. Cigarettes had become less affordable in 73% of 
high-income countries (27/37), 61% of upper-middle-in-
come countries (14/23) and 31% of lower-middle and 
low-income countries (10/32). Ratifying the FCTC earlier 
was associated with cigarettes becoming less affordable 
in 2014 implying perhaps that countries with affordable 
cigarette prices in 1999 were quicker to ratify the FCTC 
and implement its tax provision (table 3). Cigarettes 
became more affordable in countries with high rates of 
per capita GDP growth between 1999 and 2014. Lack of 
state capacity was associated with lower odds for having 
less affordable cigarettes. The variance inflation factors 
ranged from 1.04 to 1.10, indicating no multicollinearity 
problems.
As a sensitivity analysis, we also ran OLS regression with 
cigarette affordability in 2014 as the dependent variable 
for the whole sample. We used the same independent 
variables as in logit analysis. The direction of association 
was again similar as in logit analysis. Ratifying the FCTC 
earlier was positively associated with cigarettes becoming 
less affordable in 2014 (coeff. 0.04, p=0.03), while GDP 
growth (coeff. −0.10, p=0.001) and lack of state capacity 
(coeff. −0.02, p=0.001) were negatively associated with 
having less affordable cigarettes.
dIsCussIOn
Our results confirm earlier findings showing slow prog-
ress in meeting the 75% or 50% tobacco tax rate targets 
among low-income and middle-income countries.2 26 
Likewise, our results support concerns2 that FCTC Article 
6 has not, in general, led countries to implement high 
Table 3 Odds of cigarettes being less affordable by 2014
Variable OR (95% Cl)
Years since FCTC ratification 1.23* (1.02 to 1.50)
GDP per capita growth from 1999 to 
2014
0.48† (0.28 to 0.75)
State capacity 0.90* (0.82 to 0.99)
Number of countries (observations) 91
*P≤0.05; †P≤0.01.
FCTC, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; GDP, gross 
domestic product. 
Figure 2 Shares of price of 100 cigarette packs of GDP per capita in 1999 and 2014 as per cent of retail price. FCTC, 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; GDP, gross domestic product.
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tobacco taxes. Lack of success can be partly attributed 
to state fragility. More fragile countries in terms of secu-
rity, political, economic and social development may not 
have administrative and technical capacity to implement 
high tobacco taxes.27–30 We did not detect an interaction 
between state capacity and time since FCTC ratification 
which indicates that weak state capacity as such may not 
prevent countries from ratifying FCTC. Promoting the 
FCTC should include strengthening of the basic func-
tions of government.31 32
Countries with higher tax rates in 1998/1999 were more 
likely to have at least a 75% tax rate in 2014. Increasing 
tobacco taxes requires determined action from govern-
ments. Countries that had higher tobacco taxes before 
the FCTC continued to do so also after ratifying it. The 
results indicate a path-dependency in tobacco taxation 
policies.33–35 The passing of tobacco tax policies is a contin-
gent event that sets into motion institutional patterns that 
have deterministic properties.36 The result emphasises 
the importance of intensifying efforts to implement high 
tobacco taxes, especially in countries with originally low 
tax rates.
Surprisingly, lower, not higher, cigarette prices in 
1998/1999 were associated with 75% tobacco tax rates 
in 2014 (table 2). Countries with low cigarette prices 
in 1998/1999 may have reached the target with regular 
inflationary adjustments. This association may also reflect 
a possible ceiling effect where governments are reluc-
tant to increase tobacco taxes if the cigarettes are already 
relatively expensive. This could also result from tobacco 
industry lobbying.2 7–9 FCTC Article 6 and its implemen-
tation guidelines expressly emphasise health goals in 
determining tobacco taxation. The health groups play 
an important role in creating awareness and building 
capacity for FCTC implementation.30 37 38 It is also possible 
that it is easier for a country to reach the 75% tax rate if 
the price was low before the tax increase.
Consistent with earlier studies on cigarette affordability, 
cigarettes were more affordable in 2014 than in 1999 
despite tax increases.2 24 39 40 Our paper includes data 
collected well after 2010, so we have been able to base 
our analysis on a longer time horizon than earlier anal-
yses and thereby confirm well-established trend in ciga-
rette affordability. Countries that ratified FCTC earlier on 
average had less affordable cigarettes in 2014. The results 
seem to contradict the earlier finding of the non-signif-
icant association of FCTC ratification with having high 
cigarette taxes. It may well be that the FCTC prompted 
countries to increase tobacco taxes but not enough to 
obtain 50% or 75% tax rates. It is also possible that coun-
tries with already high tax rates were more likely to ratify 
FCTC earlier. If we include 199 tobacco tax rates in the 
model, FCTC ratification remains statistically significant.
There are many different ways that one could define an 
‘effective’ tax rate, including 70% tax rate as specified in 
the WHO Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administra-
tion.1 The MPOWER set a target of 75% of price. Because 
this is a paper on the effect that the FCTC had on tax 
policy, we used the WHO’s own standard of success as 
defined in MPOWER. The MPOWER measures for effec-
tive tax rates are arbitrary and different measures could 
also be used.
Our results emphasise the role of economic develop-
ment in preventing cigarettes from becoming less afford-
able. If incomes rise quickly, cigarettes become more 
affordable even if taxes are kept constant.2 24 This devel-
opment is reflected in our result where rapid per capita 
GDP growth between 1999 and 2014 has been associated 
with more affordable cigarettes in 2014. Among those 
14 countries where the per capita GDP increased more 
than 300% in 15 years, cigarettes were less affordable in 
just three countries. In fact, the weakness of set tobacco 
tax rate targets, for example, 50% of retail price, is that 
they do not take into account the effect of rising incomes 
or industry pricing behaviour. Keeping other factors 
constant, the demand for cigarettes generally increases 
with the average level of income, especially in low-income 
and middle-income countries.24
Lack of state capacity was associated with both lower 
odds for having high tobacco taxes and less affordable 
cigarettes. Tobacco taxes are low and cigarettes are 
affordable in more fragile countries, while taxes are high 
and cigarettes less affordable in more stable countries. 
As of 2018, the multinational tobacco companies were 
targeting countries in Asia and Africa with young popu-
lations and relatively low smoking prevalence, especially 
among women.41
The tax provisions in the FCTC do not include 
specific tax targets.5 The unwillingness of FCTC parties 
to commit to minimum tax levels during FCTC negotia-
tions is reflected in the lack of subsequent action.42 FCTC 
guidelines for Article 6 implementation recommend that 
parties should take into account 'both price elasticity 
and income elasticity of demand, as well as inflation and 
changes in household income, to make tobacco products 
less affordable over time in order to reduce consumption 
and prevalence'.5 Our results demonstrate that current 
policies for implementing tobacco taxes fail to meet this 
recommendation.
In our sample, cigarettes became more affordable from 
1999 to 2014. Taking the FCTC guideline recommenda-
tion seriously would entail the conference of the FCTC 
parties assigning definite targets not only for tobacco tax 
rates but also for measures that prevent tobacco products 
from becoming more affordable.
The effect of cigarettes becoming more affordable 
with rapid income rises can be prevented by adopting 
adequate policies.39 40 43 One example is a tax esca-
lator which is adjusted to income growth or an equiv-
alent variable that accounts for increases in consumer 
purchasing power.2 Such a tax escalator is already 
in place in the UK.44 With automatically increasing 
tobacco taxes by the increase in purchasing power the 
tobacco companies would increase prices which would 
prevent tobacco products not becoming more afford-
able. To allow this process to take place, tobacco tax 
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rates could, at least temporarily, rise even above the 
75% standard. Another option is to set a tax for each 
brand guaranteeing a 75% tax for every product. Doing 
so would make it more difficult for tobacco companies 
to downshift tax increases.
limitations
Assessing the change in tax as a share of price over time 
can be complicated.19 Determination of tax rates as a 
proportion of total cigarette retail price is dependent 
on changes in tax rates but also on changes in wholesale 
prices. Consequently, despite an increase in the tax on 
cigarettes, the share of excise and total taxes in the retail 
price could remain the same or shrink depending on 
how the tobacco companies respond to the tax increase. 
Similarly, the share of taxes in the final retail price might 
increase, even if there is no change in the tax levied on 
a pack of cigarettes. The FCTC might have prompted 
countries to increase tobacco taxes but not enough, given 
that the FCTC did not specify 50%/75% tax rates as a 
requirement.
The Article 6 guidelines were adopted in 2014, 9 years 
after the FCTC entered force and may have delayed 
parties’ attention to implementing tax increases. Other 
analyses of health warning labels18 33 (Article 11), smoke-
free policies34 (Article 8) and advertising bans35 (Article 
13), however, demonstrated an effect of FCTC ratification 
without considering the delay in adoption of the imple-
menting guidelines for these articles.
To establish a baseline before FCTC, we used tobacco 
tax and price data from two different sources, WB survey 
from 199920 and the International Tobacco Documenta-
tion Centre’s21 1998 International Fiscal Guide to Tobacco. 
Both data sources include information on retail price 
of the most-sold cigarette brand. The high correlation 
(0.947) for overlapping price information indicates 
the data have been collected in a substantially uniform 
manner. The correlation for tax data was lower (0.676). 
This lower correlation could indicate a measurement 
error in the datasets or it could indicate that tobacco 
taxes increased from 1998 to 1999 more dramatically than 
cigarette prices. Given the more reliable international 
standing, we deemed the WB survey more reliable than 
the International Fiscal Guide to Tobacco produced by the 
tobacco industry. We focused on the price and tax for the 
most-sold cigarette brand on all data sources including 
WHO data for 2014,19 but were unable to confirm that 
definitions remained stable over time. The most-sold ciga-
rette may not fully describe the effect of tobacco taxation 
to tobacco consumption. We did not analyse the tax struc-
ture. Our outcome variable, the share of all tobacco taxes 
of the most sold brand, does not fully capture the role of 
taxes in reducing demand for tobacco. Earlier research 
has shown the tobacco industry may simultaneously 
absorb the tax increases on its cheapest brands while over-
shifting taxes on premium brands.12 The higher the level 
of the excise and other taxes the less room for tobacco 
industry price differentiation strategies. We were not able 
to analyse how countries’ tax policies have accounted for 
country-specific price and income elasticities.
In this study, we were not able to assess the causal effects. 
Besides the variables used in this study, other factors such 
as economic cycles, political leadership and tobacco 
control activity outside of FCTC may have affected the 
outcome variables.
Our analysis focused only on cigarettes, ignoring other 
categories of tobacco products, some of which (eg, bidi) 
were more prevalent in more fragile countries such as 
Bangladesh and India.45 Since we had data only from two 
time points, we were not able to assess trends in tax, price 
and affordability in prior periods.
COnClusIOns
In contrast to advertising restrictions,33 35 health warning 
labels33 and smoke-free environments,34 FCTC ratifi-
cation has not been systematically followed regarding 
higher tobacco taxation. FCTC Article 6 does not stipu-
late specific tax rates. MPOWER tax rate targets were not 
introduced before 2008. The more specific FCTC Articles 
8, 11 and 13 discuss smoke-free environments, health 
warnings and advertising bans that fall into domain 
of health government, while Article 6 concerns finan-
cial policy which falls under finance ministries. There 
need to be further efforts to increase finance ministries’ 
knowledge of and responsibility to implement Article 
6. Fragile countries are less likely to have high tobacco 
taxes. Rapid rise in incomes undermines the effectiveness 
of tobacco taxes. Guidelines for FCTC Article 6 imple-
mentation should assign definite targets for tobacco taxes 
and for the implementation of a tax escalator that grad-
ually increases taxes to match the rising income levels. 
The tobacco control community should collaborate with 
other parts of civil society to intensify efforts to help more 
fragile countries to improve performance in FCTC imple-
mentation both through strengthening their administra-
tive and technical capacity and through supporting the 
basic functions of government. The FCTC conference 
of the parties should assign definite targets not only for 
tobacco tax rates but also for measures to prevent tobacco 
products from becoming more affordable.
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